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Abstract—Modern security protocols may involve humans in
order to compare or copy short strings between different devices.
Multi-factor authentication protocols, such as Google 2-factor or
3D-secure are typical examples of such protocols. However, such
short strings may be subject to brute force attacks. In this paper
we propose a symbolic model which includes attacker capabilities
for both guessing short strings, and producing collisions when
short strings result from an application of weak hash functions.
We propose a new decision procedure for analysing (a bounded
number of sessions of) protocols that rely on short strings. The
procedure has been integrated in the AKISS tool and tested on
protocols from the ISO/IEC 9798-6:2010 standard.
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern security protocols often include the human as a
participant on his own, i.e., separately from the device he
may own and use. Such security protocols are sometimes
called security ceremonies [18]. In this paper we are interested
in protocols where a human has to copy, or compare short
strings, or verification codes on two devices. This kind of sit-
uations occurs rather frequently. In multi-factor authentication
protocols, such as 3D-secure [1] or Google 2-factor [21], a
short verification code is sent by SMS to the user’s phone
who has to copy it to another device (to prove ownership of
his phone). Another example is bluetooth tethering [9], [10]
where the human user has to compare codes displayed by
two devices to be connected. There has also been a recent
standard [23] defining several mechanisms for “manual” data
transfer: these protocols use a human to ensure that two
devices can exchange some data in an authentic way without
sharing any cryptographic keys, nor relying on a PKI. One
important aspect is that the user introduces a low bandwidth
channel: he is only able to copy (or compare) short strings.
The ISO/IEC 9798-6:2010 standard [23] suggests that such
short strings are 16-20 bits long. As pointed out in [25], [26],
traditional methods are not suitable to reason about the security
of protocols over non standard channels, and the purpose of
this paper is to pursue the effort towards formalizing protocols
that rely on low bandwith channels.
As an illustrative example, we may consider the simplified
commitment scheme [26] which is also described below. This
protocol relies on the existence of two empirical channels.
The research leading to these results has received funding from the
European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020
research and innovation program (grant agreements No 645865-SPOOC and
No 714955-POPSTAR), as well as from the French National Research Agency
(ANR) under the project Sequoia.
According to [26], an empirical channel is a low bandwidth
channel that is
• asynchronous: the attacker may delay the delivery,
• authentic: the attacker may not inject messages, and
• public: the channel does not guarantee confidentiality.
Such a channel is typically implemented by an out-of-band
channel to a human who copies the data. Message transmission
on an empirical channel is denoted by →e:
1. A → B : infoA, hash(infoA, nA, rA)
2. B →e A : ack
3. A → B : nA
4. A →e B : rA
The goal of this protocol is to ensure that B will receive
the information infoA as sent to him by A. Here rA is a
short random value, whereas nA is a long random nonce.
We will now explain the need of the acknowledgment (sent
in message 2) and the nonce nA (included in the hash and
sent in message 3). If we remove the nonce nA we obtain
a weaker protocol. Indeed, once the attacker has obtained
the modified message 1, i.e. infoA, hash(infoA, rA), he can
compute the value of the short random rA by brute force.
Once rA is known, the attacker can send an alternative
information infoI of his choice to B by modifying the first
message to infoI , hash(infoI , rA). If we remove message 2
a similar attack is possible as the attacker can just intercept
messages 1 and 3 and perform a similar brute force attack.
The above example illustrates that short strings, that are
subject to brute force, or guessing attacks are extremely tricky.
One of the most successful approaches for analysing security
protocols is the symbolic approach for automated security
protocol analysis, based on the seminal ideas of Dolev and
Yao [17]. Indeed, there exist today mature tools for analysing
security protocols [7], [28], [4], [19], which have been used
to successfully analyse real world protocols such as, e.g.,
authentication standards [5]. With the exception of a few tools
(which we discuss in our related work section below), existing
analysis tools do however not take into account adversary
capabilities for reasoning about weak secrets. Therefore, we
devise in this paper a symbolic protocol verification technique
that allows to take such guesses into account.
Our contributions. In this paper we extend the AKISS ver-
ification tool [11] and the underlying theory to take into
account protocols that manipulate short secrets that are subject
to brute force attacks. AKISS allows automated analysis of
security protocols when restricted to a bounded number of
sessions. Cryptographic primitives may be defined through
arbitrary convergent equational theories that have the finite
variant property. This class of theories includes standard
cryptographic primitives such as symmetric and asymmetric
encryption, digital signatures, hash functions, . . . , as well as
less commonly supported primitives such as blind signatures
and zero knowledge proofs. As we will see the framework is
actually flexible enough to model weak hash functions, i.e.,
hash functions whose output is short enough to be copied
by a human. Termination is guaranteed for theories that are
subterm convergent, but the tool may terminate in practice on
protocols relying on other theories [11]. Protocols in AKISS
are written in a process calculus that is similar to the applied
pi calculus [2]. Our first contribution is an extension of the
semantics to allow an attacker to learn a weak secret during the
execution: the fact that a secret may be guessed is expressed
by a test that succeeds if the attacker is given the secret to
be guessed, but fails if the secret is replaced by a fresh name.
We note that our definitions are stated for arbitrary equational
theories. Our modeling is reminiscent of the treatment of
guessing attacks in password based protocols [14] (see the
related work below). Next, building on the theory underlying
AKISS, we design a novel verification procedure to verify
authentication properties expressed as reachability properties
for our new semantics. Unlike the original theory underlying
AKISS we also allow disequality tests (else branches) when
verifying reachability properties.
The procedure has been implemented in the AKISS tool
and used to analyze several protocols from the ISO/IEC
9798-6:2010 standard [23]. In addition to weak secrets, we
also considered weak hash functions, i.e., hash functions
whose output is short and that are subject to collisions. We
encode the attacker’s capability to find collisions through an
equational theory in a way that is similar to [12]. Our case
studies also required us to consider different kind of channels,
depending on whether out-of-band channels are supposed to
be synchronous or asynchronous, public or confidential and
authentic or not. We propose an encoding for each of these
different kinds of channels.
Related work. The works closest to ours are the ones by
Roscoe et al. [26] and Delaune and Jacquemard [15]. In [26],
they propose the use of the process algebra CSP and the
model-checker FDR to analyze protocols relying on weak
secrets. Their tool is however restricted to messages of finite
length and particular equational theories, i.e., they analyze
a finite state system and do not allow for user specified
equational theories. In [15], they propose a decision procedure
for solving a similar problem than the one studied here.
However, they rely on a simpler setting, e.g. no disequality
tests, only a fixed set of primitives preventing them to model
weak hash functions. More importantly, they do not provide
any tool support, and their procedure is actually far from being
implementable. In [12], Chothia et al. use the ProVerif tool [8]
to analyze commitment protocols. Their work inspired our
encoding of weak hash functions, for which collisions may
be found, through an equational theory. However, they do not
offer support for short random secrets that may be guessed
and learned by the adversary during a protocol execution.
Our definition of whether a secret is guessable is similar to
the definition of dictionary attacks in password-based proto-
cols [14], which can be encoded in terms of static equivalence
and verified using tools able to check equivalence properties,
such as [8], [11]. A similar definition was also proposed
by Lowe [24] in the CSP process algebra. However, when
verifying dictionary attacks we are only interested in knowing
whether the password may be learned or not. In the protocols
studied in this paper, the short secrets are often revealed
anyway (see message 4 in the example above). Therefore,
deciding whether a weak name is guessable is not a relevant
question in the protocols studied here, and existing approaches
cannot be used. Here, we need to dynamically add knowledge
of the secret to the attacker knowledge. This is technically
more challenging as we may need to consider different secrets
that may be needed to be guessed in a same execution for a
successful attack. Multiple short secrets naturally arise as soon
as several sessions are considered. In particular, using sym-
bolic techniques (that do not explicitly represent the infinite
number of all possible executions), it is not sufficient to check
separately whether secrets are guessable, as one may need to
guess one secret to be able to guess a second one.
There has also been interesting work on modeling human
behavior in protocols [6]. We do not consider this aspect,
which is orthogonal, in our work.
All files related to the tool implementation and case studies
are available at [3] and full proofs are provided in the long
version of this paper [16].
Outline. In Section II, we recall some basic definitions for
modelling messages. Then, in Section III, we explain how the
attacker may extract information from the messages exchanged
in the course of a protocol execution. We introduce our
formalism for modelling protocols in Section IV. We restrict
ourselves to a minimalistic core calculus which is sufficient
to develop our main result. Later on (see Section VII), we
will introduce a richer calculus and explain how this richer
model is translated into the former. In Section V, we provide
an abstract representation of processes expressed in our core
calculus as Horn clauses. Next, we present our saturation
procedure based on Horn clause resolution in Section VI. We
present our algorithm, as well as its integration in AKISS
in Section VII. Lastly, in Section VIII, we report the results
we obtained when analysing two protocols from the ISO/IEC
9798-6:2010 standard.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Term algebra
As usual in symbolic models we represent messages as
terms. We consider three infinite and disjoint sets of names:
Nprv is the set of private names, which are used to represent
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nonces or keys generated by honest participants, Npub is the
set of public names, which are used to represent identifiers
available both to the attacker and to honest participants, as well
as attacker nonces, and Nguess is the set of guessable names,
which are used to represent data with low entropy such as
passwords or PIN numbers. Let N = Nprv]Npub]Nguess. We
consider two infinite and disjoint sets of variables, denoted X
and W . Variables in X = {x, y, . . .} typically refer to
unknown parts of messages expected by participants while
variables in W = {w1,w2, . . .} are used to store messages
known by the attacker.
We consider a signature Σ, i.e. a finite set of function
symbols together with their arity. As usual, a function symbol
of arity 0 is called a constant. Given a signature Σ and a
set of atoms A we denote by T (Σ,A) the set of terms,
defined as the smallest set that contains A and that is closed
under application of function symbols in Σ. We denote by
vars(t) the set of variables occurring in a term t. As usual, a
substitution is a function from variables to terms, that is lifted
to terms homomorphically. The application of a substitution
σ to a term u is written uσ, and we denote dom(σ) its
domain, i.e. dom(σ) = {x | σ(x) 6= x}. We denote the
identity substitution, whose domain is the empty set, by ∅.
The positions of a term are defined as usual.
We associate an equational theory E to the signature Σ. The
equational theory is defined by a set of equations of the form
u = v where u, v ∈ T (Σ,X ), and induces an equivalence
relation over terms: =E is the smallest congruence relation on
terms, which contains all equations u = v in E, and that is
closed under substitution of terms for variables.
Example 1: Let Σ = {〈·, ·〉/2, proj1/1, proj2/1, hash/1},
and consider the equational theory Ehash defined by adding
the following equations:
proj1(〈x, y〉) = x, and proj2(〈x, y〉) = y.
The function symbol 〈·, ·〉 models pairs, whereas projection
functions are denoted proj1 and proj2. We use the unary
symbol hash to model a standard cryptographic hash function.
Let mA = 〈infoA, hash(〈infoA, rA〉)〉 with infoA ∈ Npub,
and rA ∈ Nguess. We have that:
hash(〈proj1(mA), rA〉) =Ehash proj2(mA).
We may also consider equations to model e.g. symmetric
and asymmetric encryption. We will see in Section VIII how
these equations can be used to model short hashes.
B. Finite variant property
A rewrite system R is a set of rewrite rules of the form
`→ r where `, r ∈ T (Σ,X ), and vars(r) ⊆ vars(`). A
term t can be rewritten to u, denoted t→R u, if there exists
a position p in t, a rule `→ r in R and a substitution σ such
that:
• t|p = `σ, i.e. the term at position p in t is equal to `σ;
and
• u = t[rσ]p, i.e. u is the term obtained by replacing t|p
with rσ in t.
The relation →∗R denotes the transitive and reflexive closure
of →R. A rewrite system R is convergent if it is:
• confluent: for any t, t1, t2 such that t→∗R t1 and t→∗R t2
there exists u such that t1 →∗R u and t2 →∗R u; and
• terminating: it does not admit any infinite sequence
t0 →R t1 →R t2 →R . . .
We denote by t↓R (or simply t↓) the normal form of a term t.
In the following we only consider equational theories E that
can be represented by a rewrite system R which is convergent,
i.e., we have that u =E v ⇔ u↓R = v↓R.
Example 2: Continuing Example 1, we consider the rewrite
system Rhash given below:
proj1(〈x, y〉)→ x proj2(〈x, y〉)→ y
Actually, we have that Rhash is convergent and it represents
the equational theory Ehash defined in Example 1.
Given a convergent rewrite system R, we now define the
notion of complete set of variants, which was first introduced
in [13].
Definition 1: Consider a rewrite system R that is conver-
gent, and a set of terms T . A set of substitutions variantsR(T )
is called a complete set of variants for the set of terms T , if
for any substitution ω there exist σ ∈ variantsR(T ), and a
substitution τ such that xω↓ = xσ↓τ for any x ∈ vars(T ),
and (tω)↓ = (tσ)↓τ for any t ∈ T .
The set of variants of t represents a pre-computation such
that the normal form of any instance of t is equal to an instance
of tσ↓ for some σ in the set of variants, without the need
to apply further rewrite steps. A rewrite system has the finite
variant property if for any sequence of terms a finite, complete
set of variants exists and is effectively computable. For the
sake of readability, we will often write variantsR(t1, . . . , tn)
instead of variantsR({t1, . . . , tn}).
Example 3: Continuing our running example, let Ti =
{proji(y)} for i ∈ {1, 2}, let σ1 be the identity substitution
and σ2 = {y 7→ 〈y1, y2〉}. The set {σ1, σ2} is a complete set
of variants for T1 (resp T2). Indeed, for any substitution ω,
either we have that proji(yω↓) is in normal form, and there-
fore σ1 (together with τ = ω↓) will satisfy the requirements.
Otherwise, we have that yω↓ is actually a pair 〈m1,m2〉,
and we conclude choosing the substitution σ2 (together with
τ = {y1 7→ m1, y2 7→ m2}).
This finite variant property is satisfied by many equational
theories interesting for modelling cryptographic protocols,
e.g. symmetric and asymmetric encryption, signatures, blind
signatures, zero-knowledge proofs. Moreover, this property
implies the existence of a complete set of unifiers, and gives
us a way to compute it effectively [20].
Definition 2: Consider a convergent rewrite system R. Let
Γ = {u1 = v1, . . . , uk = vk} be a set of equations. A set of
substitutions Σ is called a complete set of R-unifiers for Γ if:
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1) each σ ∈ Σ is such that uiσ↓ = viσ↓ for i ∈ {1, . . . , k};
2) for each θ such that uiθ↓ = viθ↓ for any i ∈ {1, . . . , k},
there exists σ ∈ Σ and a substitution τ such that xθ↓ =
xστ↓ for any x ∈ vars(Γ).
We denote csuR(Γ) such a set.
When R = ∅, it is well-known that for any
Γ = {u1 = v1, . . . , uk = vk}
which admits a solution (i.e. there exists σ such that for any
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we have that uiσ = viσ), such a complete set
can be chosen with cardinality one. This element is actually
unique up to some renaming and we denote it mgu(Γ) or
mgu(u, v) when Γ = {u = v}.
In the following, we consider equational theories E that can
be represented by a convergent rewrite system R that has the
finite variant property.
III. CAPABILITIES OF THE ATTACKER
At a particular point in time, after some interaction with
a protocol, an attacker may know a sequence of messages
t1, . . . , t` ∈ T (Σ,N ). Such a sequence is organised into a
frame
ϕ = {w1 7→ t1, . . . ,w` 7→ t`}
that is a substitution with domain dom(ϕ) = {w1, . . . ,w`},
and size |ϕ| = `.
Definition 3: Let ϕ be a frame, and t ∈ T (Σ,N ).
We say that t is strongly deducible from ϕ (using R), written
ϕ `−R t, when Rϕ↓ = t↓ for some R ∈ T (Σ,Npub]dom(ϕ)).
Similarly, we say that t is weakly deducible from ϕ (us-
ing R), written ϕ `+R t, when Rϕ↓ = t↓ for some R ∈
T (Σ,Npub ]Nguess ] dom(ϕ)).
Intuitively, an attacker is able to deduce new messages
by applying function symbols in Σ to public names (those
in Npub) and terms he already knows (those in ϕ). The term R
is called a recipe. Assuming that the attacker has access to
names in Nguess, this gives him more power, and allows him
to (weakly) deduce more terms.
Definition 4: Let ϕ be a frame, and g ∈ Nguess. We say that
g is guessable from ϕ when there exist R1, R2 ∈ T (Σ,Npub]
Nguess ] dom(ϕ)) such that:
• R1ϕ =E R2ϕ, and
• R′1ϕ 6=E R′2ϕ where R′i = Ri{g 7→ g′} for some fresh
name g′ (i ∈ {1, 2}).
The idea underlying this definition is the following. The
frame ϕ represents the information known by the attacker. To
see if the attacker is able to infer the value of a guessable data,
we check whether the attacker can distinguish a situation in
which he has access to all the correct guesses from one where
we provide him with a wrong value (here g′ instead of g) for
the weak data that he targeted. To distinguish the situation the
attacker must apply a test (here R1 and R2) that holds when
faced with the right value of the guess, but fails otherwise.
Example 4: Let ϕ = {w1 7→ 〈infoA, hash(〈infoA, rA〉)〉}
with rA ∈ Nguess. The name rA is guessable from ϕ.
Indeed, considering the recipes R1 = proj2(w1) and R2 =
hash(〈proj1(w1), rA〉), we have that:
• R1ϕ =Ehash hash(〈infoA, rA〉) =Ehash R2ϕ, whereas
• (R1{rA 7→ r′A})ϕ 6=Ehash R2{rA 7→ r′A}ϕ.
However, we may note that rA is not guessable from
ϕ′ = {w1 7→ 〈infoA, hash(〈infoA, 〈nA, rA〉〉)〉}
assuming that nA ∈ Nprv. Intuitively, without knowing nA,
there is no way for the attacker to check whether he has
correctly guessed the value rA.
This way of modelling guessable names allows one to take
into account the fact that weak names are deducible by the
attacker as soon as he has a way to verify that the guess he has
performed is correct. This reflects the deduction capabilities
of the attacker in a more accurate way than what happens in
usual attacker models. However, this modelling comes with
some limitations since it does not take into account the fact
that a sufficiently large set of guessable names is as secure as a
(strong) name. Indeed, in our setting, assuming that r1, . . . , rk
are names from Nguess, it is possible to guess all these names
from the message hash(〈r1, 〈r2 . . . , rk〉〉), independently of k.
IV. OUR CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROCESS CALCULUS
We assume that cryptographic protocols are modelled using
a simple process calculus which has some similarities with
the applied pi calculus [2]. Following [11], we only consider
a minimalistic core calculus, additionally extended with dise-
quality tests and guess actions.
A. Syntax
Let Ch be a set of public channel names. A protocol
is modelled by a finite set of processes generated by the
following grammar:
P,Q ::= 0 null process
in(c, x).P input
out(c, t).P output
[s = t].P positive test
[s 6= t].P negative test
guess(g).P guess
where x ∈ X , s, t ∈ T (Σ,N ] X ), c ∈ Ch, and g ∈ Nguess.
As usual, a receive action in(c, x) acts as a binding construct
for the variable x. We assume the usual definitions of free
and bound variables for processes. We also assume that each
variable is bound at most once. A process is ground if it does
not contain any free variables. For the sake of conciseness, we
sometimes omit the null process at the end of a process.
We may note that our calculus does not include operators for
parallel composition, and we do not consider private channels.
Given that we only consider a bounded number of sessions
(i.e. a process calculus without replication) and that we aim at
verifying a reachability based property, parallel composition,
but also private channels, can be added as syntactic sugar to
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denote the set of all interleavings. To ease the presentation, we
also introduce a special action guess(g) in order to indicate
at which step guessing on g has to be done. At the price of a
(potentially exponential) blow-up on the number of processes
needed to model a given protocol, we may indeed assume that
this kind of actions is given explicitly.
Example 5: As a running example, we consider the fol-
lowing process where c ∈ Ch, ack ∈ Npub, rA ∈ Nguess, and
x, y ∈ X :
Pweak = out(c,mA).guess(rA).in(c, y).
out(c, rA).[hash(〈proj1(y), rA〉) = proj2(y)].
[proj1(y) 6= infoA].0
where mA = 〈infoA, hash(〈infoA, rA〉)〉.
Intuitively, this process models one possible interleaving
(among many others) of the different actions of one session
of the weak version of the protocol described in Section I.
In order to keep this example simple, we discard the action
out(c, ack) (output of a public name), and we have arbitrarily
chosen to perform a guess action on rA at the second step.
Moreover, the purpose of the final test [proj1(y) 6= infoA]
is to see whether B can accept a message different from
the expected one, i.e. infoA. Intuitively, an execution of this
process until the end will correspond to an attack on the
protocol. Of course, in order to perform a security analysis,
given a protocol (as the one described in Section I), we have
to explain how such interleavings are computed. This is briefly
explained in Section VII-C where a richer calculus (with some
convenient, additional operators) is introduced. Moreover, the
way out-of-band channels are encoded is explained in Sec-
tion VIII-B.However, the theoretical development explained
in Sections V, VI, and VII, only rely on the syntax formally
introduced in this section.
We may be interested to study a similar interleaving of
actions for the strong version of the protocol (the one with
nA ∈ Nprv). This gives us:
Pstrong = out(c,mA).guess(rA).in(c, y).
out(c, nA).out(c, rA).
[hash(〈proj1(y), 〈nA, rA〉〉) = proj2(y)].
[proj1(y) 6= infoA].0
B. Semantics
We can now define the semantics of our process calculus
by means of a labelled transition relation on configurations. A
configuration is a pair (P,ϕ) where P is a ground process, and
ϕ is a frame used to record the messages that the participants
have sent previously, and that are known by the attacker.
The relation l−→ where l is either an input, an output, a test,
or a guess is defined as follows:
RECV (in(c, x).P, ϕ)
in(c,t)−−−−→ (P{x 7→ t↓}, ϕ) if ϕ `+R t
SEND (out(c, t).P, ϕ)
out(c)−−−→ (P,ϕ ∪ {w|ϕ|+1 7→ t↓})
TEST= ([s = t].P, ϕ) test
=
−−−→ (P,ϕ) if s↓ = t↓
TEST 6= ([s 6= t].P, ϕ) test
6=
−−−→ (P,ϕ) if s↓ 6= t↓
GUESS (guess(g).P, ϕ)
guess(g)−−−−−→ (P,ϕ ∪ {w|ϕ|+1 7→ g})
if g is guessable from ϕ
The label in(c, t) represents the input of a message t sent
by the attacker over the channel c. The label out(c) indicates a
message sent over channel c, and transition rule SEND records
the message sent in the frame. The rule TEST=, respectively
TEST 6=, checks equality, respectively difference, of s and t
in the equational theory and is labelled by test=, respectively
test 6=. The label guess(g) represents the fact that the value g
has been guessed, and this is only possible when g ∈ Nguess
is indeed guessable. In such a case, g is added into the frame.
Example 6: Considering the process Pweak given in Exam-
ple 5, we have that
(Pweak, ∅)
out(c)−−−→ guess(rA)−−−−−−→ (P2, {w1 7→ mA,w2 7→ rA})
in(c,〈infoI ,hash(〈infoI ,w2〉)〉)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ (P3, {w1 7→ mA,w2 7→ rA})
out(c)−−−→ test
=
−−−→ test
6=
−−−→ (0, {w1 7→ mA,w2 7→ rA,w3 7→ rA})
where infoI ∈ Npub. This execution corresponds to the attack
described in the introduction. The fact that guess(rA) can be
fired is a direct consequence of the fact that rA is guessable
from ϕ (see Example 4). Note that this action would not be
possible starting from (Pstrong, ∅). This comes from the fact
that rA is not guessable from ϕ′ (see Example 4).
In the rest of the paper, for our technical development, we
also consider an alternative semantics :
l
− is defined as l−→,
except that rules TEST 6= and GUESS are replaced by the two
following ones:
(guess(g).P, ϕ)
guess(g)
−−−−− (P,ϕ ∪ {w|ϕ|+1 7→ g})
([s 6= t].P, ϕ)
test 6=
−−− (P,ϕ)
i.e., this alternative semantics does neither check whether a
name is indeed guessable, nor differences of terms.
The goal of this paper is to analyse confidentiality and
authentication properties of protocols that rely on weak secrets.
These properties can be directly encoded as reachability prop-
erties in a process. We therefore study the Guess Reachability
Problem defined as follows.
Guess Reachability Problem
• Input: A ground process P
• Output: Do there exist l1, . . . , ln, and a frame ϕ such that
(P, ∅) l1,...,ln−−−−→ (∅, ϕ)?
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We emphasise that the execution is defined w.r.t. l−→ and
not
l
−. A difficulty is to ensure that g is guessable when a
guess(g) action is fired and that disequalities hold when they
occur. In case such a complete execution exists, we say that
the process P is guess reachable.
In case, the ground process under study only contains one
guess action at the end, this problem is similar to the problem
of deciding whether a protocol is resistant against guessing
attack. Here, the difficulty is to develop a procedure allowing
us to consider several guesses. Note also that, contrary to the
case of password-based protocols, guessing a data is not a
goal in itself, and does not necessarily lead to an attack on a
protocol. In many protocols, participants first commit to weak
data and reveal it later in the execution.
V. MODELLING USING HORN CLAUSES
As the original procedure described in [11] and imple-
mented in the AKISS tool, our decision procedure is based
on a fully abstract modelling of a process in first-order Horn
clauses. We give the details of this modelling in this section.
A. Predicates
We define the set of symbolic runs, denoted u, v, w, . . ., as
the set of finite sequences of symbolic labels:
u, v, w := ε | l, w
where l is of the form in(c, t), out(c), test=, test 6=, or guess(g)
with t ∈ T (Σ,N ] X ), c ∈ Ch, and g ∈ Nguess.
The empty sequence is denoted by ε. Intuitively, a symbolic
run stands for a set of possible runs of the protocol. We denote
u v v when u is a prefix of v.
We assume a set Y of recipe variables disjoint from X ,
and we use capital letters X,Y, Z to range over Y . We
assume that such variables may only be substituted by terms
in T (Σ,Npub ]Nguess ]W ] Y).
We consider five kinds of predicates over which we con-
struct the atomic formulas of our logic. Below, w denotes a
symbolic run, R,R′ are terms in T (Σ,Npub]Nguess]W]Y),
and t is a term in T (Σ,N ] X ). Informally, these predicates
have the following meaning (see Figure 1 for the formal
semantics).
• reachability predicate: rw holds when the run w is
executable in the alternative semantics
l
− , i.e., ignoring
constraints on guesses and differences;
• attacker knowledge predicate: k−w(R, t) holds if whenever
the run w is executable (w.r.t. −), the message t can be
constructed by the attacker using the recipe R that does
not contain names in Nguess;
• attacker extended knowledge predicate: k+w(R, t) holds if
whenever the run w is executable (w.r.t. −), the message
t can be constructed by the attacker using the recipe R
that may contain names in Nguess;
• identity predicate: iw(R,R′) holds if whenever the run w
is executable (w.r.t. −), R and R′ (that may contains
names in Nguess) are recipes for the same term; and
• reachable identity predicate: riw(
−→
R,
−→
R′) is a short form
for the conjunction of iw(R1, R′1), . . . , iw(Rn, R
′
n), and
rw, where
−→
R = (R1, . . . , Rn), and
−→
R′ = (R′1, . . . , R
′
n).
A (ground) atomic formula is interpreted over a pair con-
sisting of a process P and a frame ϕ, and we write (P,ϕ) |= f
when the atomic formula f holds for (P,ϕ) or simply P |= f
when ϕ is the empty frame. We consider first-order formulas
built over the above atomic formulas and the usual connectives
(conjunction, disjunction, negation, implication, existential and
universal quantification). The semantics is defined as expected,
but the domain of quantified variables depends on their type:
variables in X may be mapped to any term in T (Σ,N ), while
recipe variables in Y are mapped to recipes.
Example 7: Let Pweak be the process defined in Example 5,
and consider the following run:
w0 = out(c), guess(rA), in(c,mI), out(c), test=, test 6=
with mI = 〈infoI , hash(〈infoI , rA〉)〉. We have Pweak |= rw0 ,
and this is a direct consequence of the execution trace given
in Example 6. We have that Pweak |= iout(c)(R1, R2) where
R1 = proj2(w1) and R2 = hash(〈proj1(w1), rA〉)). Indeed,
the only frame reachable from Pweak through the run out(c)
is ϕ as defined in Example 4. Let t = hash(〈infoA, rA〉), we
have that ϕ `+R1 t (actually we have ϕ `
−
R1
t) and ϕ `+R2 t.
Let Pstrong as given in Example 5, and w′0 be as follows:
out(c).guess(rA), in(c,m′I), out(c), out(c), test
=, test6=
with m′I = 〈infoI , hash(〈infoI , 〈nI , rA〉〉)〉. We have also that
Pstrong |= rw′0 since such a trace is indeed executable w.r.t. the
weak semantics −.
B. Seed statements
We now identify a subset of the formulas, which we call
statements. Statements will take the form of Horn clauses, and
we shall be mainly concerned with them.
Definition 5: A statement is a Horn clause of the form
H ⇐ k?1u1(X1, t1), . . . , k
?n
un(Xn, tn)
where:
• H ∈ {ru0 , k
−
u0(R, t), k
+
u0(R, t), iu0(R,R
′), riu0(
−→
R,
−→
R′)};
• u0, u1, . . . , un are symbolic runs such that ui v u0 for
any i ∈ {1, . . . , n};
• t, t1, . . . , tn ∈ T (Σ,N ] X );
• R,R′ as well as elements of
−→
R (resp.
−→
R′) are in
T (Σ,Npub ]Nguess ]W ] Y);
• and X1, . . . , Xn are distinct variables from Y .
Lastly, we have that vars(t) ⊆ vars(t1, . . . , tn) when
H = k?u0(R, t) with ? ∈ {−,+}.
In the definition above, we implicitly assume that all vari-
ables are universally quantified, i.e. all statements are ground.
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(P0, ϕ0) |= rl1,...,ln if (P0, ϕ0)
l1− (P1, ϕ1)
l2− . . .
ln− (Pn, ϕn)
(P0, ϕ0) |= k−l1,...,ln(R, t) if when (P0, ϕ0)
l1− (P1, ϕ1)
l2− . . .
ln− (Pn, ϕn) then ϕn `−R t
(P0, ϕ0) |= k+l1,...,ln(R, t) if when (P0, ϕ0)
l1− (P1, ϕ1)
l2− . . .
ln− (Pn, ϕn) then ϕn `+R t
(P0, ϕ0) |= il1,...,ln(R,R′) if there exists t such that (P0, ϕ0) |= k
+
l1,...,ln
(R, t) and (P0, ϕ0) |= k+l1,...,ln(R
′, t)
(P0, ϕ0) |= ril1,...,ln(
−→
R,
−→
R′) if (P0, ϕ0) |= rl1,...,ln and for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k (P0, ϕ0) |= il1,...,ln(Ri, R′i)
where
−→
R,
−→
R′ = (R1, . . . , Rk), (R
′
1, . . . , R
′
k)
Fig. 1. Semantics of atomic formulas
By abuse of language we sometimes call σ a grounding
substitution for a statement H ⇐ B1, . . . , Bn when σ is
grounding for each of the atomic formulas H,B1, . . . , Bn.
r`1στ↓,...,`mστ↓ ⇐ {k
−
`1στ↓,...,`j−1στ↓(Xj , xjστ↓)}j∈R(m)
for all 0 ≤ m ≤ n
for all σ ∈ csuR({sk = tk}k∈T=(m))
for all τ ∈ variantsR(`1σ, . . . , `mσ)
k−`1στ↓,...,`mστ↓(w|S(m)|+|G(m)|, tmστ↓)⇐
{k−`1στ↓,...,`j−1στ↓(Xj , xjστ↓)}j∈R(m)
for all m ∈ S(n)
for all σ ∈ csuR({sk = tk}k∈T=(m))
for all τ ∈ variantsR(`1σ, . . . , `mσ, tmσ)
k−`1στ↓,...,`mστ↓(w|S(m)|+|G(m)|, gm)⇐
{k−`1στ↓,...,`j−1στ↓(Xj , xjστ↓)}j∈R(m)
for all m ∈ G(n)
for all σ ∈ csuR({sk = tk}k∈T=(m))
for all τ ∈ variantsR(`1σ, . . . , `mσ)
k−`1,...,`m(f(Y1, . . . , Yk), f(y1, . . . , yk)τ↓)⇐
{k−`1,...,`m(Yj , yjτ↓)}j∈{1,...,k}
for all 0 ≤ m ≤ n
for all function symbols f of arity k
for all τ ∈ variantsR(f(y1, . . . , yk)).
k+`1,...,`m(f(Y1, . . . , Yk), f(y1, . . . , yk)τ↓)⇐
{k+`1,...,`m(Yj , yjτ↓)}j∈{1,...,k}
for all 0 ≤ m ≤ n
for all function symbols f of arity k
for all τ ∈ variantsR(f(y1, . . . , yk)).
k−ε (c, c)⇐ for all names c ∈ N 0pub
k+ε (g, g)⇐ for all names g ∈ N 0guess
Fig. 2. Set seed(P,N 0pub,N
0
guess) of seed statements
As mentioned above, our decision procedure is based on an
abstract modelling of a process in first-order Horn clauses. In
this section, given a ground process P we will give a set of
statements seed(P ) which will serve as a starting point for the
modelling. We shall also establish that the set of statements
seed(P ) is a sound and (partially) complete abstraction of the
ground process P . In order to formally define seed(P ), we
start by fixing some conventions.
Let P = a1.a2. . . . .an be a ground process. We assume
w.l.o.g. the following naming conventions:
1) if ai is a receive action then ai = in(ci, xi).
2) if ai is a send action then ai = out(ci, ti).
3) if ai is a guess action then ai = guess(gi).
4) if ai is a positive test action then ai = [si = ti].
5) if ai is a negative test action then ai = [si 6= ti].
Moreover, we assume that xi 6= xj for any i 6= j. For each
1 ≤ i ≤ n, we define the symbolic label `i as follows:
`i =

in(ci, xi) if ai = in(ci, xi)
out(ci) if ai = out(ci, ti)
guess(gi) if ai = guess(gi)
test= if ai = [si = ti]
test 6= if ai = [si 6= ti]
For each 0 ≤ m ≤ n, let R(m) (resp. S(m), G(m),
T=(m), and T 6=(m)) be the set of indices of the receive
(resp. send, guess, positive and negative test) actions amongst
a1, . . . , am. Moreover, we denote by |Γ| the number of ele-
ments in such a set Γ. Formally,
• R(m) = { i | 1 ≤ i ≤ m and ai = in(ci, xi) };
• S(m) = { i | 1 ≤ i ≤ m and ai = out(ci, ti) };
• G(m) = { i | 1 ≤ i ≤ m and ai = guess(gi) };
• T=(m) = { i | 1 ≤ i ≤ m and ai = [si = ti] };
• T 6=(m) = { i | 1 ≤ i ≤ m and ai = [si 6= ti] }.
Given a set of public names N 0pub ⊆ Npub, and a set of
guessable namesN 0guess ⊆ Nguess, the set of seed statements as-
sociated to P , N 0pub, and N 0guess denoted seed(P,N 0pub,N 0guess),
is defined to be the set of statements given in Figure 2.
Intuitively, the first three kinds of seed statements allows one
to express that as soon as suitable messages are deducible
by the attacker to fill the receive actions occurring before
step m, the process is indeed (weakly) executable until step m.
Moreover, in case its mth action is either a send action or a
guess action, the corresponding term (or guess) will become
(strongly) deducible by the attacker.
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If (N 0pub,N 0guess) = (Npub,Nguess), then we write seed(P )
as a shortcut for seed(P,Npub,Nguess). This set is is said to
be the set of seed statements associated to P .
Example 8: Continuing our running example, among others,
we have the following statements in seed(Pweak):
f1 : k
−
out(c)(w1,mA)⇐
f2 : k
−
out(c).guess(rA)(w2, rA)⇐
f3 : rw ⇐ k−out(c).guess(rA)(Y, 〈y1, hash(〈y1, rA〉)〉)
f+4 : k
+
out(c)(hash(X), hash(x))⇐ k
+
out(c)(X,x)
f−5 : k
−
out(c)(proj2(Y ), proj2(y))⇐ k
−
out(c)(Y, y)
f−6 : k
−
out(c)(proj2(Y ), y2)⇐ k
−
out(c)(Y, 〈y1, y2〉)
where w = out(c), guess(rA), in(c, 〈y1, hash(〈y1, rA〉)〉),
out(c), test=, test 6=.
Intuitively, f1 represents that mA is (strongly) deducible
through recipe w1 once the first ouput has been performed,
whereas f2 represents that rA is strongly deducible once the
two first actions out(c) and guess(rA) have been performed.
The statement f3 says that the process Pweak is (weakly)
executable until its last action if a message of the form
〈m, hash(〈m, rA〉)〉 (for some m) is deducible from the infor-
mation available to the attacker after executing the two first
actions, i.e. knowing the first output mA and the value rA.
Some statements, e.g., f+4 , f
−
5 and f
−
6 , represent the
capabilities of the attacker. The two last ones (f−5 and f
−
6 )
are computed relying on variantsR(proj2(y)) = {σ1, σ2} (see
Example 3).
C. Soundness and completeness
We shortly show that the set of seed statements is a sound
and (partially) complete modelling of a process. However, we
need one more definition to state this fact.
Definition 6: Given a set K of statements, H(K) is the
smallest set of ground facts such that:
CONSEQ
σ grounding for f =
(
H ⇐ B1, . . . , Bn
)
∈ K
B1σ ∈ H(K), . . . , Bnσ ∈ H(K)
Hσ ∈ H(K)
EXTEND
k?u(R, t) ∈ H(K) wih ? ∈ {−,+}
k?uv(R, t) ∈ H(K)
WEAKENING
k−u (R, t) ∈ H(K)
k+u (R, t) ∈ H(K)
We show that as far as reachability predicates and attacker
knowledge predicates are concerned, the set seed(P ) is a
complete abstraction of a process (w.r.t. −).
Theorem 1: Let P be a ground process.
• Soundness: P |= f for any f ∈ seed(P ) ∪H(seed(P ));
• Completeness: If (P, ∅)
l1,...,lm−−−−− (Q,ϕ) then
1) rl1↓,...,lm↓ ∈ H(seed(P ));
2) if ϕ `?R t with ? ∈ {−,+} then k
?
l1↓,...,lm↓(R, t↓) ∈
H(seed(P )).
We will show how the completeness of seed(P ) can be
built upon to achieve full abstraction, i.e., including also
identities of the process P and a procedure for checking guess
reachability.
VI. SATURATION
A. Saturation procedure
In this section we will describe the saturation procedure. It
manipulates a set of statements called a knowledge base.
Definition 7: Given a statement f = (H ⇐ B1, . . . , Bn),
• f is said to be solved if for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we have that
Bi = k
?i
wi(Xi, xi) for some ?i ∈ {−,+}, xi ∈ X , and
Xi ∈ Y .
• f is said to be well-formed if whenever it is solved and
H = k?w(R, t) for some ? ∈ {−,+}, we have that t 6∈ X .
A set of well-formed statements is called a knowledge base.
If K is a knowledge base, Ksolved = {f ∈ K | f is solved }.
The saturation procedure is a non-deterministic process
whose purpose is to produce a knowledge base starting from
an initial one. Roughly, the saturation procedure works as
follows. Each time a new statement is generated, the knowl-
edge base is updated with it. This process continues until
reaching a fixed point. At the end, we obtain a knowledge base
Ksat ∈ sat(Kinit). The set of reachable fixed points starting
from the initial set Kinit is denoted sat(Kinit).
a) Generating new statements: Given a knowledge
base K, new statements are generated by applying the rules
in Figure 3. Each rule generates a new statement h. Roughly,
the rule RESOLUTION applies the standard rule of resolution
from first-order logic between an unsolved statement f and a
solved deduction statement g. We do not require ?′ = ? but
only ?′ ≤ ? which is formally defined as follows:
?′ ≤ ? if, and only if,
{
either ?′ = ?;
or (?′, ?) = (−,+).
This condition reflects the intuition that any term that is
strongly deducible, is also weakly deducible. The rule EQUA-
TION allows us to derive new identities on recipes that may
be imposed by the execution of the protocol. The rule TEST
allows us to derive a sequence of identities (at most one per
guess action) that necessarily hold in an execution of the
protocol. Once the statement h is generated, we update the
knowledge base K with h as explained below.
b) Update: We will now define the update operator d
which adds statements generated by the rules of Figure 3 to
the knowledge base.
Definition 8: Let K be a knowledge base, and f = H ⇐ B
a statement. The update of K by f , denoted Kdf , is K∪{f}
when f is either not a solved deduction statement, or a well-
formed and solved deduction statement. Otherwise, we have
that f = k?u(R, x) ⇐ B with k
?′
u′(X,x) ∈ B for some ?′, u′,
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RESOLUTION
f =
(
H ⇐ k?uv(X, t), B1, . . . , Bn
)
g =
(
k?
′
w (R, t
′)⇐ Bn+1, . . . , Bm
)
f ∈ K, g ∈ Ksolved σ = mgu(ku(X, t), kw(R, t′)) t 6∈ X ?, ?′ ∈ {−,+} ?′ ≤ ?
K = K d h where h =
(
H ⇐ B1, · · · , Bm
)
σ
EQUATION
f =
(
k?u(R, t)⇐ B1, . . . , Bn
)
g =
(
k?
′
u′v′(R
′, t′)⇐ Bn+1, . . . , Bm
)
f, g ∈ Ksolved σ = mgu(〈u, t〉, 〈u′, t′〉) ?, ?′ ∈ {−,+}
K = K d h where h =
(
iu′v′(R,R
′)⇐ B1, . . . , Bm
)
σ
TEST
g = rw ⇐ B f1 =
(
iw1(R1, R
′
1)⇐ B1
)
· · · fn =
(
iwn(Rn, R
′
n)⇐ Bn
)
g, f1, . . . , fn ∈ Ksolved σ = mgu({wixi,= w}1≤i≤n) n = #guess(w), and #guess(wi) < i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
K = K d h where h =
(
riw((R1, . . . , Rn), (R
′
1, . . . , R
′
n))⇐ B,B1, . . . ,Bn
)
σ
Fig. 3. Saturation rules
and X (by definition of a statement). In such a case, we have
that:
K d f = K ∪ iu(R,X)⇐ B
c) Initial knowledge base: We finally define on which
knowledge base we initiate the saturation procedure.
Definition 9: Given a set of statements S, the initial
knowledge base associated to S, denoted Kinit(S), is defined
to be the empty knowledge base updated by the set S, i.e.,
Kinit(S) = (((∅ d f1) d . . .) d fn)
where f1, . . . , fn is an enumeration of the statements in S.
Lemma 1: Given a ground process P , N 0pub ⊆ Npub,
and N 0guess ⊆ Nguess, the set Kinit(seed(P,N 0pub,N 0guess)) is
a knowledge base. Moreover, given a knowledge base K, any
set of statements obtained through the saturation procedure is
also a knowledge base.
Example 9: We consider the seed statements introduced in
Example 8. An application of the resolution rule between f−6
and the solved statement f1 leads to the following solved
statement
h = k−out(c)(proj2(w1), hash(〈infoA, rA〉))⇐
which is simply added to the knowledge base by the update
operator. We may then decide to apply the equation rule
between h and f+4 which leads to the statement:
iout(c)(proj2(w1), hash(X))⇐ k
+
out(c)(X, 〈infoA, rA〉)
and then, after several resolution steps, we are able to derive
the solved statement
iout(c)(proj2(w1), hash(〈infoA, rA〉)⇐
Similarly, we are able to derive rw ⇐ k−out(c),guess(rA)(Y1, y1)
by performing several resolution steps starting from f3. There-
fore, we may apply the TEST rule to derive ffinal:
riw(proj2(w1), hash(〈infoA, rA〉)⇐ k
−
out(c),guess(rA)(Y1, y1)
Intuitively, this statement means that the symbolic run w
is indeed executable and leads to a test proj2(w1) =
hash(〈infoA, rA〉) that holds in the resulting frame (provided
the attacker knows a public value that will be used to instan-
tiate y1).
B. Soundness and completeness
We extend H(K) to establish that any Ksat ∈ sat(Kinit(P ))
is a complete abstraction of P .
Definition 10: Let K be a set of statements. We define
He(K) to be the smallest set of ground facts containing H(K)
and that is closed under the rules of Figure 4.
We have that the set of solved statements produced by the
saturation procedure is a sound and complete abstraction of
the ground process P (w.r.t. −). More formally, we have the
following result.
Theorem 2: Let K ∈ sat(Kinit(P )) for some ground
process P . We have that:
• Soundness: P |= f for any f ∈ K ∪He(K);
• Completeness: If (P, ∅)
l1,...,ln−−−− (Q,ϕ) then
1) rl1↓,...,ln↓ ∈ He(Ksolved);
2) if ϕ `+R t then k
+
l1↓,...,ln↓(R, t↓) ∈ He(Ksolved);
3) if ϕ `+R t and ϕ `
+
R′ t, then il1↓,...,ln↓(R,R
′) ∈
He(Ksolved).
VII. OUR PROCEDURE
In this section, we first discuss the effectiveness and ter-
mination of the saturation procedure. Then, we describe our
algorithm to solve the Guess Reachability Problem as stated
at the end of Section IV. We finally discuss the integration of
our algorithm in the verification tool AKISS.
A. Effectiveness of the saturation procedure
In this section, we will discuss some issues on how to
effectively compute a saturated knowledge base and also
discuss termination of the saturation procedure.
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REFL
iw(R,R) ∈ He(K)
TRAN
iw(R1, R2) ∈ He(K) iw(R2, R3) ∈ He(K)
iw(R1, R3) ∈ He(K)
SYM
iw(R1, R2) ∈ He(K)
iw(R2, R1) ∈ He(K)
CONG
iw(R1, R
′
1), . . . , iw(Rn, R
′
n) ∈ He(K) f ∈ Σ
iw(f(R1, . . . Rn), f(R
′
1, . . . R
′
n)) ∈ He(K)
EXT
iu(R,R
′) ∈ He(K)
iuv(R,R
′) ∈ He(K)
EQ. CONSEQ.
k+w(R, t) ∈ H(K) iw(R,R′) ∈ He(K)
k+w(R
′, t) ∈ He(K)
Fig. 4. Rules of He(K)
A first issue comes from the fact that Kinit(P ) is infinite.
Indeed, the set seed(P ) for a ground process P is infinite
because Npub and Nguess contain an infinite set of names.
We follow [11] to overcome this difficulty. Intuitively, we do
only need to consider names occurring in P for its saturation;
clauses representing names not occurring in P do not influence
the saturation of the remaining clauses. Formally, we have the
following result.
Lemma 2: Let P be a ground process, NPpub ⊆
Npub (resp. NPguess ⊆ Nguess) be the finite set of public
names (resp. guessable names) occurring in P , and K0 ∈
sat(Kinit(seed(P,NPpub,NPguess))). We have that K ⊆ K0 ∪ S
for some K ∈ sat(Kinit(P )) and a set S containing statements
of the form:
• k−ε (n, n)⇐ for any n ∈ Npub;
• k+ε (g, g)⇐ for any g ∈ Nguess;
• iε(n, n)⇐ for any n ∈ Npub ∪Nguess;
• riu((R1, . . . , Rk), (R
′
1, . . . , R
′
k)) ⇐ B where
(Ri0 , R
′
i0
) = (n, n) for some 1 ≤ i0 ≤ k, and
n ∈ Npub ]Nguess.
The saturation procedure may itself not terminate even if the
initial knowledge base is finite. As shown in [11] in a simple
setting, we conjecture that our saturation procedure terminates
for the class of subterm convergent equational theories. More
importantly, we have implemented our procedure and tested
it on several examples considering various equational theories
that are not subterm convergent, and our tool did terminate on
all practical examples we have tested.
B. Description and correctness of the algorithm
Our procedure is described in Figure 5. Let P be a ground
process and K0 ∈ sat(Kinit(seed(P,NPpub,NPguess))) where
NPpub (resp. NPguess) is the set containing all public names
(resp. guessable names) occurring in P . In our procedure, P
is represented by the set K0solved of solved statements of K
0.
The test GUESS-REACHABILITY(P ) checks whether there
exists a reachable identity ri`1,...,`n(
−→
R,
−→
R′) ⇐ B in K0solved
that corresponds to a real execution after replacement of the
remaining variables with fresh constants. For guess actions, we
simply check whether the recipes Rjω and R′jω are witnesses
of the fact that the jth guess action contains indeed a guessable
name. If all these tests succeed then P is indeed guess
reachable. Otherwise, in case no such a reachable identity
exists, then process P is not guess reachable.
Theorem 3: Let P be a ground process, NPpub ⊆
Npub (resp. NPguess ⊆ Nguess) be the finite set of public
names (resp. guessable names) occurring in P . Let K0 ∈
sat(Kinit(seed(P,NPpub,NPguess))).
We have that P is guess reachable if, and only if GUESS-
REACHABILITY(P , K0solved) holds.
The soundness part of this theorem is an easy consequence
of our algorithm. Completeness is more involved. It is based
on Theorem 2 but some works remains to be done to ensure
that disequality tests will be satisfied. More importantly, we
have to ensure that enough reachable identity predicates will
be generated and tested. This is needed to ensure that when
a weak name is guessable, then our algorithm will find a
test witnessing this fact. Intuitively, our procedure will only
generate small tests and our completeness results shows that
this is indeed sufficient when we are looking for an attack.
Note that, we have to consider all the tests (one per guess)
together, and this may require to perform instantiations that
will not be needed when considering only one guess. Intu-
itively, this comes from the fact that the attacker may need to
output messages that are quite complex to ensure that all the
guessable data will become guessable when needed (on the
same trace).
C. Integration in AKISS
We have implemented all of the before described theory in
the AKISS tool. To ease the specification of the protocols, the
AKISS tool supports additional operators in the process cal-
culus for parallel composition (P ||Q), sequential composition
(P :: Q) [11], and we also allow the use of (statically defined)
private channels. All these constructions are syntactic sugar
and can be translated to sets of (linear) processes eventually
at the cost of an exponential blow-up.
While the original version of AKISS only allowed the
verification of equivalence properties we added support for
reachability properties (specified by the means of events).
Similarly we allow to define authentication properties as (non-
injective) correspondance properties. These correspondance
properties are specified by annotating the protocols with
begin and end events and are internally translated into simple
reachability properties. Note that such a translation requires
the use of disequality tests.
The tool also automatically annotates the protocol with
the necessary guess actions, i.e., the protocol specifier is
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GUESS-REACHABILITY(P , K0solved)
Let n be the number of actions occurring in P .
For all ri`1,...,`n(
−→
R,
−→
R′)⇐ k?1w1(X1, x1), . . . , k
?m
wm(Xm, xm) ∈ K
0
solved
Let c1, . . . , ck be fresh names in Npub such that σ : vars(`1, . . . , `n) ∪ {x1, . . . , xm} → {c1, . . . , ck} is a bijection.
Let ω = {Xi 7→ xiσ | 1 ≤ i ≤ m}.
Check whether (P, ∅) = (P0, ϕ0)
`1σ−−→ . . . (Pn−1, ϕn−1)
`nσ−−→ (Pn, ϕn) = (∅, ϕ) using the recipes Rjω and R′jω
as a witness for guessing the guessable name in the jth guess action. If this execution is valid, return Yes.
Return No.
Fig. 5. Test for checking guess reachability
not required to include these actions. Intuitively, these guess
actions have to be inserted at all possible steps. To limit the
number of interleavings we implement a few straightforward
optimisations: guess actions are only inserted before inputs
when an output occurred since the last guess of the given weak
name; when generating the interleavings we always favour
outputs as they increase the attacker’s knowledge which is
a sound optimisation when verifying reachability properties.
VIII. CASE STUDIES
In this section we demonstrate that our tool can be effec-
tively used to analyse protocols based on weak secrets. Weak
secrets may either be low-entropy secrets (the guessable names
introduced in Section II) or the result of applying a function
that produces a short output, e.g., truncating the output of
a hash function. The ISO/IEC 9798-6:2010 standard [23]
suggests that “short” corresponds to 16-20 bits. We will first
describe how we can model such weak hash functions. Weak
secrets are often used in protocols relying on a (low capacity)
out-of-band channel. We therefore also explain how out-of-
band channels can be encoded in our formalism.
A. Weak functions
Sometimes short verification codes need to be transmitted.
One way for generating these codes is to use weak hash
functions whose output is short enough to be, e.g., copied
or compared by a human. However, when the output of the
function is short, an attacker may efficiently find collisions.
As AKISS supports user specified equational theories, we
encode this property in the equational theory. While, strong
cryptographic hash functions are modelled as free symbols,
the property that collisions may be found by the attacker on
a keyed hash function is reflected using equations:
sh(k′, bf(k′, sh(k,m))) = sh(k,m)
sh(bf(m′, sh(k,m)),m′) = sh(k,m)
The first equation models that given a short hash sh(k,m) and
an arbitrary key k′, the attacker may find by brute force a mes-
sage m′ = bf(k′, sh(k,m)) such that sh(k,m) = sh(k′,m′).
The second equation allows to fix the message m′ and find a
key k′ = bf(m′, sh(k,m)) such that sh(m, k) = sh(m′, k′). A
similar modelling was also used by Chothia et al. in [12] for
verifying commitment protocols in ProVerif.
The ISO/IEC 9798-6:2010 standard [23] distinguishes two
types of short hash functions, which they call check value
functions and message digests. While both generate short
hashes, they differ on the keys they take as input: check
value functions take as second argument a weak key and
message digests a strong key. Our model does reflect these
two types of hash functions, simply depending on whether the
second argument is a weak name or not. The requested security
property for short hash functions is that an attacker may not
find two messages m,m′ such that sh(m, k) = sh(m′, k) for
a non-negligible fraction of the key space. This property is
indeed reflected by our modelling as the equation sh(m,x) =
sh(m′, x) does not hold for arbitrary keys, unless m = m′.
B. Out-of-band channels
When out-of-band channels are used in protocols we may
consider different kinds of channels, depending on whether
the communication is supposed to be confidential, authentic,
and synchronous. To model these different kind of channels,
we allow the use of private channels, similar to the applied
pi calculus. However, we only allow static channel names,
i.e., channel names are not transmitted dynamically during the
protocol execution. In that case, private channels are merely
syntactic sugar for generating the appropriate traces.
We consider the following types of channels:
• Public channels: they offer no guarantee and correspond
to normal output actions in our calculus.
• Private channels: communications are confidential, au-
thentic and synchronous; this corresponds to a usual
communication using a private channel.
• Asynchronous, private channels: such communications
offer confidentiality and authentication, but may be de-
layed by the attacker; asynchrony is encoded as usual
by performing the output in parallel, i.e., if cap is an
asynchronous private channel, we replace out(cap, u).P
with P | out(cpriv, u).0 where cpriv is a private channel.
• Asynchronous, authentic, but non-confidential (or sim-
ply authentic) channels can be encoded similarly; if
caa is an asynchronous authentic channel, we replace
out(caa, u).P with out(cpub, u).P | out(cpriv, u).0 where
cpub is a public channel and cpriv is a private channel.
Which channel is the most appropriate depends on the
context and the nature of the out-of-band channel.
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C. Protocols with manual data transfer
The ISO/IEC 9798-6:2010 standard [23] presents several
protocols for transferring authenticated data among two de-
vices. The mechanisms differ in the assumptions on the
input/output capabilities of the devices, the used of hash
functions and the actions a user has to perform.
Devices may have a standard or simple input or output
interface. While standard interfaces allow to enter/display al-
phanumeric strings, a simple interface generally only consists
in a button or a light to confirm or infirm success. Hash
functions may be short hash functions, cryptographic hash
functions or MACs. Humans may need to either compare or
copy short strings. Some protocols also require the human to
generate a short random string.
To illustrate our work, we will detail below mechanisms 2
and 4 of [23].
a) Manual authentication mechanism 2: The protocol
assumes two devices that have both a standard output interface
and a simple input interface. The protocol uses a check-value
function, i.e., a short hash function which uses a weak key.
The protocol assumes that both devices are in proximity of a
human who is able to compare short strings displayed on both
device’s output interface.
The protocol is described in Figure 6. Initially, data dA
and dB are provided to devices A, respectively B. The goal
of the protocol is to check whether the devices agree on the
data. We assume that the data can be chosen freely by the
attacker. Once they have received their data the devices signal
to the user that they are ready. When both devices are ready,
the user informs device A that it may start, e.g., by pressing
the button of the simple input interface. Device A generates a
fresh, weak key k and transmits it (on an insecure channel) to
device B. Both devices display the key k and the short hash of
their data with k on their output interface. The user compares
the output of both devices and enters either accept or reject
depending on whether the displayed codes coincide or not.
The protocol is easily encoded in the process calculus
serving as the input language of AKISS. The process mod-
elling the authentication mechanism is entirely displayed in
Figure 7 where k is a weak name, and channels ah1, ah2,
ha1, ha2, bh1, bh2, and hb are private channels used for
encoding authentic channels as explained in Section VIII-B.
We briefly explain below the process B given in Figure 7.
Initially, dB is provided to device B. Therefore, B initially
waits for an input, and answers by outputting the constant
ready on an authentic (but non-confidential) channel. To model
these channel properties we rely on the encoding explained
in Section VIII-B. Then, device B is waiting for another
message on a classical (i.e. insecure) channel. B answers to
this message by sending the key it just received as well as the
short hash it has computed. Both are sent on another authentic
channel (encoded in a similar way than before). Once this
is done, it simply waits for an answer from the user (this is
modelled through a communication on the private channel hb).
Device A Human user Device B
data dA data dB
ready ready
start
new weak k
k
mA = (k, sh(k, dA)) mB = (k, sh(k, dB))
check mA
?
= mB
accept/reject accept/reject
Fig. 6. Manual authentication mechanism 2 from [23]
In case, the received value is the public constant ok (which
indicated that the user has accepted this transaction) device
B will end this session normally (modelled through the event
end). If the event end is reached authentication should hold.
The two other processes A and H are modelled in a rather
similar way. The operator :: that occurs in process H is used
to model the two synchronisations that appear from the user’s
point of view. Indeed, the user is supposed to receive the
ready message coming from both devices before he proceeds.
Similarly, the user is supposed to wait for the short strings of
both devices and compare them before he accepts/rejects.
scenario # traces time status
one session Auth. A 368 < 8s okAuth. B 168 < 4s ok
without start Auth. A 360/592 < 8s attackAuth. B 337/736 < 8s attack
without start Auth. A 592 < 4s ok
+ h strong Auth. B 736 < 5s ok
two sessions Auth. A 48852 59m okAuth. B 10794 8m30s ok
We verify the correspondance property that states that
whenever Device B finishes the protocol with data d then
Device A must have started the protocol with the same data
before, by annotating the processes with begin and end events.
Our tool easily verifies that this property indeed holds. We
can also show that if the synchronisation message ’start’ is
removed we find an attack as expected: indeed the attacker
may learn k and forge a value d′ = bf(k′, sh(k,m)) to be
sent to A in the begin of the protocol. Note that the attacker
can not chose an arbitrary value for d′ as both k and the short
hash are compared by the human. We have also verified that,
although this scenario is unrealistic, this attack is not possible
12
A =̂ in(c, xd).(out(ah1, ready)
|| out(c, ready).in(ha1, xs).[xs = start].out(c, k).(
begin(xd).out(ah2, 〈k, sh(k, xd)〉) || out(c, 〈k, sh(k, xd)〉).in(ha2, x).[x = ok]))
B =̂ in(c, yd).(out(bh1, ready)
|| out(c, ready).in(c, yk).(out(bh2, 〈yk, sh(yk, yd)〉)
|| out(c, 〈yk, sh(yk, yd)〉).in(hb, y).[y = ok].end(yd)))
H =̂ (in(ah1, za).[za = ready]. || in(bh1, zb).[zb = ready]) :: (out(ha1, start) || out(c, start).
(in(ah2, z′a) || in(bh2, z′b)) :: [z′a = z′b].(out(ha2, ok) || out(c, ok) || out(hb, ok) || out(c, ok)))
Fig. 7. Manual authentication mechanism 2 from [23] (one session Auth. B)
if we use a strong hash function instead of the short hash.
Finally we also checked that the protocol is still secure in the
case of two sequential sessions. Given that the protocol uses
a human as an intermediate we think that parallel sessions are
not a meaningful scenario.
Most of those verifications have been performed in a few
seconds on a standard laptop. Actually, only the last experi-
ments (the ones reported on the last line of each table) have
been done on a 20 core Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2687W
v3 @ 3.10GHz. We also indicate the number of traces (due
to all the possible interleaving of the actions) that have been
considered by the tool in order to conclude. Note that in case
an attack has been found, the tool stops the exploration before
considering all these traces, and this is also indicated in the
table.
The fact that the performances degrade when considering
an additional session is not surprising and is clearly correlated
with the number of traces that have to be considered to carry
out the analysis. This is the usual and well-known state-space
explosion problem inherent of the concurrent nature of the
systems we analyse. As briefly explained in Section VII-C,
we have implemented a few straightforward optimisations to
mitigate this issue, but more needs to be done in this direction.
b) Manual authentication mechanism 4: This mechanism
is decribed in Figure 8. It assumes a simple input interface and
standard output interface for device A and a simple output and
standard input interface for device B.
scenario # traces time status
one session Auth. A 35 < 1s okAuth. B 35 < 1s ok
without start Auth. A 16/70 < 1 attackAuth. B 21/125 < 1s attack
k weak Auth. A 51/175 < 1s attackAuth. B 51/175 < 1s attack
two sessions Auth. A 38290 2m okAuth. B 43876 2m ok
The protocol relies on a standard hash function and supposes
a user who can copy a short random string from device A to
device B. As in the previous protocol we assume that data dA
and dB are given to the devices and that the aim is to ensure
Device A Human user Device B
data dA data dB
new k
new weak r
m = hash(dA, k, r)
ready ready
start
r r
k
check m ?= hash(dB , k, r)
accept/rejectaccept/reject
Fig. 8. Manual authentication mechanism 4 from [23]
agreement on these data. Device A generates a strong nonce k,
a weak nonce r and sends hash(dA, k, r) to B over an insecure
network. Both devices then notify the user that they are ready
and the user informs A that it may start. A displays r to
the user who copies r into B. Moreover, A sends k to B
over the insecure network. Device B recomputes the hash and
compares it to the previously received value. If both values
are identical it outputs accept and reject otherwise. The user
enters the displayed result into device A.
We may note that, despite the high number of traces, an-
swers are relatively fast. We consider here an empty equational
theory, and therefore the saturation process is faster than for
mechanism 2.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper we presented a novel symbolic model for
reasoning about protocols that use short authentication strings,
possibly generated as the result of a weak hash function.
We propose a new procedure for verifying protocols in this
model and have implemented the procedure in the AKISS tool.
The new capabilities of the tool are illustrated by analysing
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several protocols from the ISO/IEC 9798-6:2010 standard for
authentication mechanisms for manual data transfer.
As future work we plan to perform additional case stud-
ies, as well as checking injective correspondance properties.
Another possible generalisation is to adapt our framework to
verify equivalence properties. The resulting framework might
be used for analysing vote anonymity in protocols relying on
short vote codes, such as in Pretty Good Democracy [27] or
Du-Vote [22].
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